联邦党人文集（世界大师原典文库（中文导读插图版））上下
FEDERALISTNo.1GeneralIntroduction
FEDERALISTNo.2ConcerningDangersfromForeignForceandInfluence
FEDERALISTNo.3TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.4TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.5TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.6ConcerningDangersfromDissensionsBetweentheStates
FEDERALISTNo.7TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.8TheConsequencesofHost…
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FEDERALISTNo.2ConcerningDangersfromForeignForceandInfluence
FEDERALISTNo.3TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.4TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.5TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.6ConcerningDangersfromDissensionsBetweentheStates
FEDERALISTNo.7TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.8TheConsequencesofHost…
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亚历山大·汉密尔顿（1757-1804），美国开国元勋之一，宪法起草人之一，财经专家，美国任财政部长。是美国政党制度的创建者，在美国金融、财政和工业发展史上占有重要地位。因政党相争而决斗丧生。2006年，汉密尔顿被美国的权威期刊《大西洋月刊》评为影响美国的100位人物第5名。 约翰·杰伊（1745-1829），美国政治家、革命家、外交家和法学家。他与本杰明·富兰克林和约翰·亚当斯一同出使法国、与亚历山大·汉密尔顿和詹姆斯·麦迪逊一起撰写了《联邦党人文集》。他还曾任美国法院法官，从1789年到1795年他出任美国首席大法官。1829年逝世于纽约威切斯特郡。 詹姆斯·麦迪逊（1751-1836），美国第四任总统。他担任总统期间曾领导进行第二次美英战争，保卫了美国的共和制度，为美国赢得彻底独立建立了功绩。他在1776年参加弗吉尼亚宪法的制定，是弗吉尼亚会议的领导人。他还是出席大陆会议的代表、制宪会议的主要人物、北部联邦党人文件的起草人之一、众议…
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《世界大师原典文库：联邦党人文集（中文导读插图版）（套装上下册）》是亚历山大·汉密尔顿、约翰·杰伊、和詹姆斯·麦迪逊三人为争取批准新宪法在纽约报刊上共以“普布利乌斯”为笔名而发表的一系列的论文文集。1787年费城举行的全国代表会议制定了一部新宪法。但是，在各州的批准过程中，对新宪法有两种截然相反的意见：一种拥护，一种反对。因此就发生了美国历史上一场*激烈的论战。《世界大师原典文库：联邦党人文集（中文导读插图版）（套装上下册）》就是这次论战的产物。
FEDERALISTNo.1GeneralIntroduction
FEDERALISTNo.2ConcerningDangersfromForeignForceandInfluence
FEDERALISTNo.3TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.4TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.5TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.6ConcerningDangersfromDissensionsBetweentheStates
FEDERALISTNo.7TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.8TheConsequencesofHostilitiesBetweentheStates
FEDERALISTNo.9TheUnionasaSafeguardAgainstDomesticFactionandInsurrection
FEDERALISTNo.10TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.11TheUtilityoftheUnioninRespecttoCommercialRelationsandaNavy
FEDERALISTNo.12TheUtilityoftheUnioninRespecttoRevenue
FEDERALISTNo.13AdvantageoftheUnioninRespecttoEconomyinGovernment
FEDERALISTNo.14ObjectionstotheProposedConstitutionfromExtentofTerritoryAnswered
FEDERALISTNo.15TheInsufficiencyofthePresentConfederationtoPreservetheUnion
FEDERALISTNo.16TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.17TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.18TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.19TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.20TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.21OtherDefectsofthePresentConfederation
FEDERALISTNo.22TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.23TheNecessityofaGovernmentasEnergeticastheOneProposedtothePreservationoftheUnion
FEDERALISTNo.24ThePowersNecessarytotheCommonDefenseFurtherConsidered
FEDERALISTNo.25TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.26TheIdeaofRestrainingtheLegislativeAuthorityinRegardtotheCommonDefenseConsidered
FEDERALISTNo.27TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.28TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.29ConcerningtheMilitia
FEDERALISTNo.30ConcerningtheGeneralPowerofTaxation
FEDERALISTNo.31TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.32TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.33TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.34TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.35TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.36TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.37ConcerningtheDifficultiesoftheConventioninDevisingaProperFormofGovernment
FEDERALISTNo.38TheSameSubjectContinued,andtheIncoherenceoftheObjectionstotheNewPlanExposed
FEDERALISTNo.39TheConformityofthePlanttoRepublicanPrinciples
FEDERALISTNo.40OnthePowersoftheConventiontoFormaMixedGovernmentExaminedandSustained
FEDERALISTNo.41GeneralViewofthePowersConferredbytheConstitution
FEDERALISTNo.42ThePowersConferredbytheConstitutionFurtherConsidered
FEDERALISTNo.43TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.44RestrictionsontheAuthorityoftheSeveralStates
FEDERALISTNo.45TheAllegedDangerfromthePowersoftheUniontotheStateGovernmentsConsidered
FEDERALISTNo.46TheInfluenceoftheStateandFederalGovernmentsCompared
FEDERALISTNo.47TheParticularStructureoftheNewGovernmentandtheDistributionofPowerAmongItsDifferentParts
FEDERALISTNo.48TheseDepartmentsShouldNotBeSoFarSeparatedastoHaveNoConstitutionalControloverEachOther
FEDERALISTNo.49MethodofGuardingAgainsttheEncroachmentsofAnyOneDepartmentofGovernmentbyAppealingtothePeopleThroughaConvention
FEDERALISTNo.50PeriodicalAppealstothePeopleConsidered
FEDERALISTNo.51TheStructureoftheGovernmentMustFurnishtheProperChecksandBalancesBetweentheDifferentDepartments
FEDERALISTNo.52TheHouseofRepresentatives
FEDERALISTNo.53TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.54TheApportionmentofMembersAmongtheStates
FEDERALISTNo.55TheTotalNumberoftheHouseofRepresentatives
FEDERALISTNo.56TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.57TheAllegedTendencyoftheNewPlantoElevatetheFewattheExpenseoftheManyConsideredinConnectionwithRepresentation
FEDERALISTNo.58ObjectionThattheNumberofMembersWillNotBeAugmentedastheProgressofPopulationDemandsConsidered
FEDERALISTNo.59ConcerningthePowerofCongresstoRegulatetheElectionofMembers
FEDERALISTNo.60TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.61TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.62TheSenate
FEDERALISTNo.63TheSenateContinued
FEDERALISTNo.64ThePowersoftheSenate
FEDERALISTNo.65ThePowersoftheSenateContinued
FEDERALISTNo.66ObjectionstothePoweroftheSenatetoSetasaCourtforImpeachmentsFurtherConsidered
FEDERALISTNo.67TheExecutiveDepartment
FEDERALISTNo.68TheModeofElectingthePresident
FEDERALISTNo.69TheRealCharacteroftheExecutive
FEDERALISTNo.70TheExecutiveDepartmentFurtherConsidered
FEDERALISTNo.71TheDurationinOfficeoftheExecutive
FEDERALISTNo.72TheSameSubjectContinued,andRe-EligibilityoftheExecutiveConsidered
FEDERALISTNo.73TheProvisionfortheSupportoftheExecutive,andtheVetoPower
FEDERALISTNo.74TheCommandoftheMilitaryandNavalForces,andthePardoningPoweroftheExecutive
FEDERALISTNo.75TheTreaty-MakingPoweroftheExecutive
FEDERALISTNo.76TheAppointingPoweroftheExecutive
FEDERALISTNo.77TheAppointingPowerContinuedandOtherPowersoftheExecutiveConsidered
FEDERALISTNo.78TheJudiciaryDepartment
FEDERALISTNo.79TheJudiciaryContinued
FEDERALISTNo.80ThePowersoftheJudiciary
FEDERALISTNo.81TheJudiciaryContinued,andtheDistributionoftheJudicialAuthority
FEDERALISTNo.82TheJudiciaryContinued
FEDERALISTNo.83TheJudiciaryContinuedinRelationtoTrialbyJury
FEDERALISTNo.84CertainGeneralandMiscellaneousObjectionstotheConstitutionConsideredandAnswered
FEDERALISTNo.85ConcludingRemarks
Appendixex
TheDeclarationofIndependence
TheArticlesofConfederation
TheConstitutionofTheUnitedStatesofAmerica
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FEDERALISTNo.2ConcerningDangersfromForeignForceandInfluence
FEDERALISTNo.3TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.4TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.5TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.6ConcerningDangersfromDissensionsBetweentheStates
FEDERALISTNo.7TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.8TheConsequencesofHostilitiesBetweentheStates
FEDERALISTNo.9TheUnionasaSafeguardAgainstDomesticFactionandInsurrection
FEDERALISTNo.10TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.11TheUtilityoftheUnioninRespecttoCommercialRelationsandaNavy
FEDERALISTNo.12TheUtilityoftheUnioninRespecttoRevenue
FEDERALISTNo.13AdvantageoftheUnioninRespecttoEconomyinGovernment
FEDERALISTNo.14ObjectionstotheProposedConstitutionfromExtentofTerritoryAnswered
FEDERALISTNo.15TheInsufficiencyofthePresentConfederationtoPreservetheUnion
FEDERALISTNo.16TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.17TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.18TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.19TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.20TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.21OtherDefectsofthePresentConfederation
FEDERALISTNo.22TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.23TheNecessityofaGovernmentasEnergeticastheOneProposedtothePreservationoftheUnion
FEDERALISTNo.24ThePowersNecessarytotheCommonDefenseFurtherConsidered
FEDERALISTNo.25TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.26TheIdeaofRestrainingtheLegislativeAuthorityinRegardtotheCommonDefenseConsidered
FEDERALISTNo.27TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.28TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.29ConcerningtheMilitia
FEDERALISTNo.30ConcerningtheGeneralPowerofTaxation
FEDERALISTNo.31TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.32TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.33TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.34TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.35TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.36TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.37ConcerningtheDifficultiesoftheConventioninDevisingaProperFormofGovernment
FEDERALISTNo.38TheSameSubjectContinued,andtheIncoherenceoftheObjectionstotheNewPlanExposed
FEDERALISTNo.39TheConformityofthePlanttoRepublicanPrinciples
FEDERALISTNo.40OnthePowersoftheConventiontoFormaMixedGovernmentExaminedandSustained
FEDERALISTNo.41GeneralViewofthePowersConferredbytheConstitution
FEDERALISTNo.42ThePowersConferredbytheConstitutionFurtherConsidered
FEDERALISTNo.43TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.44RestrictionsontheAuthorityoftheSeveralStates
FEDERALISTNo.45TheAllegedDangerfromthePowersoftheUniontotheStateGovernmentsConsidered
FEDERALISTNo.46TheInfluenceoftheStateandFederalGovernmentsCompared
FEDERALISTNo.47TheParticularStructureoftheNewGovernmentandtheDistributionofPowerAmongItsDifferentParts
FEDERALISTNo.48TheseDepartmentsShouldNotBeSoFarSeparatedastoHaveNoConstitutionalControloverEachOther
FEDERALISTNo.49MethodofGuardingAgainsttheEncroachmentsofAnyOneDepartmentofGovernmentbyAppealingtothePeopleThroughaConvention
FEDERALISTNo.50PeriodicalAppealstothePeopleConsidered
FEDERALISTNo.51TheStructureoftheGovernmentMustFurnishtheProperChecksandBalancesBetweentheDifferentDepartments
FEDERALISTNo.52TheHouseofRepresentatives
FEDERALISTNo.53TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.54TheApportionmentofMembersAmongtheStates
FEDERALISTNo.55TheTotalNumberoftheHouseofRepresentatives
FEDERALISTNo.56TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.57TheAllegedTendencyoftheNewPlantoElevatetheFewattheExpenseoftheManyConsideredinConnectionwithRepresentation
FEDERALISTNo.58ObjectionThattheNumberofMembersWillNotBeAugmentedastheProgressofPopulationDemandsConsidered
FEDERALISTNo.59ConcerningthePowerofCongresstoRegulatetheElectionofMembers
FEDERALISTNo.60TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.61TheSameSubjectContinued
FEDERALISTNo.62TheSenate
FEDERALISTNo.63TheSenateContinued
FEDERALISTNo.64ThePowersoftheSenate
FEDERALISTNo.65ThePowersoftheSenateContinued
FEDERALISTNo.66ObjectionstothePoweroftheSenatetoSetasaCourtforImpeachmentsFurtherConsidered
FEDERALISTNo.67TheExecutiveDepartment
FEDERALISTNo.68TheModeofElectingthePresident
FEDERALISTNo.69TheRealCharacteroftheExecutive
FEDERALISTNo.70TheExecutiveDepartmentFurtherConsidered
FEDERALISTNo.71TheDurationinOfficeoftheExecutive
FEDERALISTNo.72TheSameSubjectContinued,andRe-EligibilityoftheExecutiveConsidered
FEDERALISTNo.73TheProvisionfortheSupportoftheExecutive,andtheVetoPower
FEDERALISTNo.74TheCommandoftheMilitaryandNavalForces,andthePardoningPoweroftheExecutive
FEDERALISTNo.75TheTreaty-MakingPoweroftheExecutive
FEDERALISTNo.76TheAppointingPoweroftheExecutive
FEDERALISTNo.77TheAppointingPowerContinuedandOtherPowersoftheExecutiveConsidered
FEDERALISTNo.78TheJudiciaryDepartment
FEDERALISTNo.79TheJudiciaryContinued
FEDERALISTNo.80ThePowersoftheJudiciary
FEDERALISTNo.81TheJudiciaryContinued,andtheDistributionoftheJudicialAuthority
FEDERALISTNo.82TheJudiciaryContinued
FEDERALISTNo.83TheJudiciaryContinuedinRelationtoTrialbyJury
FEDERALISTNo.84CertainGeneralandMiscellaneousObjectionstotheConstitutionConsideredandAnswered
FEDERALISTNo.85ConcludingRemarks
Appendixex
TheDeclarationofIndependence
TheArticlesofConfederation
TheConstitutionofTheUnitedStatesofAmerica
^ 收 起
亚历山大·汉密尔顿（1757-1804），美国开国元勋之一，宪法起草人之一，财经专家，美国任财政部长。是美国政党制度的创建者，在美国金融、财政和工业发展史上占有重要地位。因政党相争而决斗丧生。2006年，汉密尔顿被美国的权威期刊《大西洋月刊》评为影响美国的100位人物第5名。 约翰·杰伊（1745-1829），美国政治家、革命家、外交家和法学家。他与本杰明·富兰克林和约翰·亚当斯一同出使法国、与亚历山大·汉密尔顿和詹姆斯·麦迪逊一起撰写了《联邦党人文集》。他还曾任美国法院法官，从1789年到1795年他出任美国首席大法官。1829年逝世于纽约威切斯特郡。 詹姆斯·麦迪逊（1751-1836），美国第四任总统。他担任总统期间曾领导进行第二次美英战争，保卫了美国的共和制度，为美国赢得彻底独立建立了功绩。他在1776年参加弗吉尼亚宪法的制定，是弗吉尼亚会议的领导人。他还是出席大陆会议的代表、制宪会议的主要人物、北部联邦党人文件的起草人之一、众议院议员、民主共和党的组织者。
^ 收 起
^ 收 起
《世界大师原典文库：联邦党人文集（中文导读插图版）（套装上下册）》是亚历山大·汉密尔顿、约翰·杰伊、和詹姆斯·麦迪逊三人为争取批准新宪法在纽约报刊上共以“普布利乌斯”为笔名而发表的一系列的论文文集。1787年费城举行的全国代表会议制定了一部新宪法。但是，在各州的批准过程中，对新宪法有两种截然相反的意见：一种拥护，一种反对。因此就发生了美国历史上一场*激烈的论战。《世界大师原典文库：联邦党人文集（中文导读插图版）（套装上下册）》就是这次论战的产物。
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