中级微观经济学精要（英文版）

　　Preface
　　1 Introduction
　　Part Ⅰ Theory of the Consumer
　　2 Preferences and Utility
　　2.1 Introduction
　　2.2 The Consumer's Preference Relation
　　2.3 The Marginal Rate of Substitution
　　2.4 The Consumer's Utility Function
　　2.5 Utility Functions and the Marginal Rate of Substitution
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　　Preface
　　1 Introduction
　　Part Ⅰ Theory of the Consumer
　　2 Preferences and Utility
　　2.1 Introduction
　　2.2 The Consumer's Preference Relation
　　2.3 The Marginal Rate of Substitution
　　2.4 The Consumer's Utility Function
　　2.5 Utility Functions and the Marginal Rate of Substitution
　　2.6 A Solved Problem
　　Exercises
　　 Appendix. Differentiation of Functions
　　3 The Budget Constraint and the Consumer's Optimal Choice
　　3.1 Introduction
　　3.2 The Standard Budget Constraint, the Budget Set, and the Budget Line
　　3.3 Shifts of the Budget Line
　　3.4 Odd Budget Constraints
　　3.5 Income and Consumption over Time
　　3.6 The Consumer's Optimal Choice: Graphical Analysis
　　3.7 The Consumer's Optimal Choice: Utility Maximization Subject to the Budget Constraint
　　3.8 Two Solved Problems
　　Exercises
　　Appendix. Maximization Subject to a Constraint:
　　 The Lagrange Function Method
　　4 Demand Functions
　　4.1 Introduction
　　4.2 Demand as a Function of Income
　　4.3 Demand as a Function of Price
　　4.4 Demand as a Function of Price of the Other Good
　　4.5 Substitution and Income Effects
　　4.6 The Compensated Demand Curve
　　4.7 Elasticity
　　4.8 The Market Demand Curve
　　4.9 A Solved Problem
　　Exercises
　　5 Supply Functions for Labor and Savings
　　5.1 Introduction to the Supply of Labor
　　5.2 Choice between Consumption and Leisure
　　5.3 Substitution and Income Effects in Labor Supply
　　5.4 Other Types of Budget Constraints
　　5.5 Taxing the Consumer's Wages
　　5.6 Saving and Borrowing: The Intertemporal Choice of Consumption
　　5.7 The Supply of Savings
　　5.8 A Solved Problem
　　Exercises
　　6 Welfare Economics 1: The One-Person Case
　　6.1 Introduction
　　6.2 Welfare Comparison of a Per-Unit Tax and an Equivalent Lump-Sum Tax
　　6.3 Rebating a Per-Unit Tax
　　6.4 Measuring a Change in Welfare for One Person
　　6.5 Measuring Welfare for Many People; A Preliminary Example
　　6.6 A Solved Problem
　　Exercises
　　 Appendix. Revealed Preference
　　7 Welfare Economics 2: The Many-Person Case
　　7.1 Introduction
　　7.2 Quasilinear Preferences
　　7.3 Consumer's Surplus
　　7.4 A Consumer's Surplus Example with Quasilinear Preferences
　　7.5 Consumers' Surplus
　　7.6 A Last Word on the Quasilinearity Assumption
　　7.7 A Solved Problem
　　Exercises
　　Part Ⅱ Theory of the Producer
　　8 Theory of the Firm 1: The Single-Input Model
　　8.1 Introduction
　　8.2 The Competitive Firm's Problem, Focusing on Its Output
　　8.3 The Competitive Firm's Problem, Focusing on Its Input
　　8.4 Multiple Outputs
　　8.5 A Solved Problem
　　Exercises
　　9 Theory of the Firm 2: The Long-Run, Multiple-Input Model
　　9.1 Introduction
　　9.2 The Production Function in the Long Run
　　9.3 Cost Minimization in the Long Run
　　9.4 Profit Maximization in the Long Run
　　9.5 A Solved Problem
　　Exercises
　　10 Theory of the Firm 3: The Short-Run, Multiple-Input Model
　　10.1 Introduction
　　10.2 The Production Function in the Short Run
　　10.3 Cost Minimization in the Short Run
　　10.4 Profit Maximization in the Short Run
　　10.5 A Solved Problem
　　Exercises
　　Part Ⅲ Partial Equilibrium Analysis: Market Structure
　　11 Perfectly Competitive Markets
　　11.1 Introduction
　　11.2 Perfect Competition
　　11.3 Market/Industry Supply
　　11.4 Equilibrium in a Competitive Market
　　11.5 Competitive Equilibrium and Social Surplus Maximization
　　11.6 The Deadweight Loss of a Per-Unit Tax
　　11.7 A Solved Problem
　　Exercises
　　12 Monopoly and Monopolistic Competition
　　12.1 Introduction
　　12.2 The Classical Solution to Monopoly
　　12.3 Deadweight Loss from Monopoly: Comparing Monopoly and Competition
　　12.4 Price Discrimination
　　12.5 Monopolistic Competition
　　12.6 A Solved Problem
　　Exercises
　　13 Duopoly
　　13.1 Introduction
　　13.2 Cournot Competition
　　13.3 More on Dynamics
　　13.4 Collusion
　　13.5 Stackelberg Competition
　　13.6 Bertrand Competition
　　13.7 A Solved Problem
　　Exercises
　　14 Game Theory
　　14.1 Introduction
　　14.2 The Prisoners' Dilemma, and the Idea of Dominant Strategy Equilibrium
　　14.3 Prisoners' Dilemma Complications: Experimental Evidence and Repeated Games
　　14.4 The Battle of the Sexes, and the Idea of Nash Equilibrium
　　14.5 Battle of the Sexes Complications: Multiple or No Nash Equilibria, and Mixed Strategies
　　14.6 The Expanded Battle of the Sexes, When More Choices Make Players Worse Off
　　14.7 Sequential Move Games
　　14.8 Threats
　　14.9 A Solved Problem
　　Exercises
　　Part IV General Equilibrium Analysis
　　15 An Exchange Economy
　　15.1 Introduction
　　15.2 An Economy with Two Consumers and Two Goods
　　15.3 Pareto Efficiency
　　15.4 Competitive or Walrasian Equilibrium
　　15.5 The Two Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics
　　15.6 A Solved Problem
　　Exercises
　　16 A Production Economy
　　16.1 Introduction
　　16.2 A Robinson Crusoe Production Economy
　　16.3 Pareto Efficiency
　　16.4 Walrasian or Competitive Equilibrium
　　16.5 When There Are Two Goods, Bread and Rum
　　16.6 The Two Welfare Theorems Revisited
　　16.7 A Solved Problem
　　Exercises
　　Part V Market Failure
　　17 Externalities
　　17.1 Introduction
　　17.2 Examples of Externalities
　　17.3 The Oil Refiner and the Fish Farm
　　17.4 Classical Solutions to the Externality Problem: Pigou and Coase
　　17.5 Modern Solutions for the Externality Problem: Markets
　　for Pollution Rights
　　17.6 Modern Solutions for the Externality Problem: Cap and Trade
　　17.7 A Solved Problem
　　Exercises
　　18 Public Goods
　　18.1 Introduction
　　18.2 Examples of Public Goods
　　18.3 A Simple Model of an Economy with a Public Good
　　18.4 The Samuelson Optimality Condition
　　18.5 The Free Rider Problem and Voluntary Contribution
　　Mechanisms
　　18.6 How to Get Efficiency in Economies with Public Goods
　　18.7 A Solved Problem
　　Exercises
　　19 Uncertainty and Expected Utility
　　19.1 Introduction and Examples
　　19.2 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility: Preliminaries
　　19.3 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility:
　　Assumptions and Conclusion
　　19.4 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility: Examples
　　19.5 A Solved Problem
　　Exercises
　　20 Uncertainty and Asymmetric Information
　　20.1 Introduction
　　20.2 When Sellers Know More Than Buyers: The Market for "Lemons"
　　20.3 When Buyers Know More Than Sellers: A Market for Health Insurance
　　20.4 When Insurance Encourages Risk Taking: Moral Hazard
　　20.5 The Principal-Agent Problem
　　20.6 What Should Be Done about Market Failures Caused by Asymmetric Information
　　20.7 A Solved Problem
　　Exercises
　　Index
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